Abstract. This paper proposes preimage attacks on hash function HAVAL whose output length is 256 bits. This paper has three main contributions; a preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL at the complexity of 2 225 , a preimage attack on 4-pass HAVAL at the complexity of 2 241 , and a preimage attack on 5-pass HAVAL reduced to 151 steps at the complexity of 2 241 . Moreover, we optimize the computational order for brute-force attack on full 5-pass HAVAL and its complexity is 2 254.89 . As far as we know, the proposed attack on 3-pass HAVAL is the best attack and there is no preimage attack so far on 4-pass and 5-pass HAVAL. Note that the complexity of the previous best attack on 3-pass HAVAL is 2 230 . Technically, our attacks find pseudo-preimages of HAVAL by combining the meet-in-the-middle and local-collision approaches, then convert pseudopreimages to a preimage by using a generic algorithm.
Introduction
Cryptographic hash functions are important primitives to build secure schemes. A hash function takes arbitrarily long bit string and outputs a hash value with a fixed length. A hash function is required to satisfy the security properties such as collision resistance, 2nd preimage resistance, and preimage resistance. When the length of the hash value is n bits, a collision, a 2nd preimage, and a preimage should not be computed faster than 2 n/2 , 2 n , and 2 n operations, respectively. HAVAL [18] is one of the dedicated hash functions and has relatively long history. HAVAL is based on Merkle-Damgård construction, and its compression function is similar to MD5 [10] . The basic operation of HAVAL is done in 32 bits that is the same as MD5. Therefore, 32-bit values are called words. However, the interface of the HAVAL compression function is doubled compared to MD5, that is, the number of chaining variables and the message length of the compression function are 8 words and 32 words respectively. The nonlinear function of HAVAL takes seven words as input and outputs a word. So, one step of HAVAL only changes one word out of 8 words of the internal state. To satisfy several security requirements, HAVAL has three variants called x-pass HAVAL (x = 3, 4, 5).
x-pass HAVAL consists of 32x steps.
Due to the simple structure, there are several cryptoanalytic results on HAVAL as shown in the next paragraph. However, regarding the preimage attack, there is only one result on 3-pass HAVAL [2] . In this paper, we propose preimage attacks on HAVAL: the best attack on 3-pass HAVAL so far, the first attack on 4-pass HAVAL and 5-pass HAVAL. - * This attack is a kind of brute force attack, but the computation is optimized.
Known previous results except for the preimage attack are as follows: collision attacks on 3-pass HAVAL are discussed in Ref. [12, 11, 13, 14] , and those on 4-pass HAVAL are discussed in Ref. [15, 17] . Note that a real collision has been generated up to 4-pass HAVAL. Theoretically, a collision of 5-pass HAVAL can be generated in 2 123 compression function evaluations [17] that is faster than the birthday paradox for 256-bit output. (Hereafter, we omit the unit of complexity whenever it is obvious and it is the number of "compression function evaluation.") Non-randomness of 4-pass and 5-pass of HAVAL in the encryption mode is analyzed by Ref. [6, 16] . The security of the HMAC-HAVAL is analyzed by Ref. [5] . A 2nd preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL and its application to HMAC-3-pass HAVAL are proposed by Ref. [7] . However, this 2nd preimage attack is different from the one usually considered. In Ref. [8] a useful statement to clarify the difference of these two types of 2nd preimage attacks is shown. The attack of Ref. [7] can generate a 2nd preimage at the complexity of one compression function with a probability of 2 −114 for a given random message, and it requires the complexity of 2 128 with a probability of 1 − 2 −114 . Therefore, the average complexity is very close to 2 128 . Consequently, no result that produces a 2nd preimage of any given message is known. Moreover, no result is known on preimage attack on HAVAL, except for the recent result on 3-pass HAVAL [2] .
Related work regarding preimage attack
In 2008, a preimage attack on MD4 was proposed by Leurent [8] . The attack first generates pseudo-preimages based on the Dobbertin's pioneering work [4] , and converts a pseudo-preimage attack to a preimage attack by using the generic approach [9, Fact9.99] 1 . Preimage attacks on step-reduced MD5 and full 3-pass HAVAL are proposed by Aumasson et al. [2] , whose approach is based on the meet-in-the-middle technique. Preimage attacks on full MD4 and 63-step MD5 are proposed by [1] , whose approach is also based on the meet-in-the-middle technique. Note, both of [2, 1] use the conversion algorithm of [9, Fact9.99 ].
In the meet-in-the-middle attack of Aumasson et al. [2] , a compression function is divided into the first half and the last half, and both computation results are compared in the middle. They also use new techniques that make the attack efficient by using the absorption properties of Boolean functions. On the other hand, Aoki and Sasaki propose new techniques to apply the meet-in-the-middle attack to not only the first half and the last half but also any two consecutive parts of a compression function [1] . This paper combines the techniques of Ref. [1, 2] , and attacks more passes of HAVAL.
Our contributions
In this paper, we propose preimage attacks on 3-, 4-, and 5-pass HAVAL whose output length is 256 bits. First, we consider a strategy to find preimages of 3-, 4-, and 5-pass HAVAL faster than the brute force attack by a few bits (strategy 1). Second, we consider another strategy that can find a preimages of 3-, 4-, and 5-pass HAVAL much more efficiently by combining techniques of [1] and [2] (strategy 2). As a result of applying strategy 2 to each pass of HAVAL, we find the best preimage attack so far on 3-pass HAVAL by using the techniques of [1] , the first preimage attack on 4-pass HAVAL by combining techniques of [1] and [2] , and the first preimage attack on step-reduced 5-pass HAVAL by combining techniques of [1] and [2] and further improving a technique of [2] . We summarize the results of the previous work and ours in Table 1 .
Organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the specification of HAVAL and techniques of existing attacks. Section 3 gives two strategies of the preimage attack that can be applied to HAVAL and other hash functions whose message expansion is similar to HAVAL. Regarding the technique in Ref. [2] as an application of a local collision, we can compute preimages of a hash function that has more rounds. Section 4 describes attacks on HAVAL following the strategy 1. Section 5 describes attacks on HAVAL following the strategy 2. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section 6. An input message M is processed to be a multiple of 1024 bits by the padding procedure. A single bit '1' is appended followed by '0's until the length becomes 944 modulo 1024. At the last, 3-bit field representing a version number
Step function of HAVAL 
where H i is a 256-bit value and IV is the initial value defined in the specification. Finally, H n is output as a hash value of M .
, where "+" denotes a 32-bit word-wise addition. In this paper, we similarly use "−" to denote a 32-bit word-wise subtraction.
R j is the step function for
Step j. Let Q j be a 32-bit value that satisfies
is defined as follows:
x a x b represents bitwise AND operation. Fig. 2 . Boolean Functions of HAVAL Table 3 . Wordwise rotation of HAVAL
where f j is a bitwise Boolean function defined in Fig. 2 , φ i,j is a wordwise permutation defined in Table 3 , π j is a message expansion function defined in Table 2 , ≫ n is n-bit right rotation, and K x,j is a constant defined in the specification.
We show a graph of the step function in Fig. 1 .
) can be computed in almost the same complexity as that of R j .
Converting pseudo-preimages to a preimage
For a given hash value y, a pseudo-preimage is a pair of (x, M ) such that CF (x, M ) = y, where x may not equal to IV and CF is a compression function of a Merkle-Damgård hash function. There is a generic algorithm that converts a pseudo-preimage attack to a preimage attack [9, Fact9.99] . Let the complexity of a pseudo-preimage attack be 2 k . The procedure of this attack when the hash value is n-bit long is as follows.
Generate 2
(n−k)/2 pseudo-preimages at the complexity of 2
(n+k)/2 messages that start from the IV , and compute their hash values.
One of these hash values is expected to be matched. The complexity of this attack is 2
. This algorithm has been used in previous preimage attacks [8, 2, 1].
Preimage attacks on 3-pass HAVAL
Aumasson et al. proposed two attacks that find a preimage of 3-pass HAVAL at the complexity of 2 230 , and the attacks require 16 × 2 64 words of memory [2] .
Both attacks take an approach of the meet-in-the-middle attack. In this paper, we are particularly interested in the Attack A of their paper [2, Algorithm 4].
In the Attack A of [2, Algorithm 4], the authors focused attention on the location of the message words m 5 and m 6 , where m 5 appears at Step 5, 32, and 94 and m 6 appears at Step 6, 55, and 89 as shown in Table 2 2 . First, chaining variables p 0 to p 6 , where p 0 is IV and p i+1 is the 256-bit output of the i-th step, are fixed so that the change of m 6 in Step 6 is guaranteed to be absorbed by changing Q −1 , which is the seventh word of the IV . Similarly, chaining variables p 95 and p 96 are fixed so that the change of m 5 in Step 94 is guaranteed to be absorbed by changing Q 95 , which is the seventh word of p 96 . Due to this effort, computation for Step 0 to 47 becomes independent of m 6 , and computation for
Step 95 to 48 becomes independent of m 5 . The authors of [2] and we call these independent words neutral words.
Finally, the authors apply the meet-in-the-middle attack to find a pseudopreimage of a given hash value
. The rough sketch of the procedure is as follows. Refer to [2] for details. In the above procedure, the meet-in-the-middle attack saves the complexity of 64 bits but step 4 of the procedure succeeds with a probability of 2 −32 . Thus, this attack is faster than the brute force attack by the factor of 2 32 .
Preimage attacks on MD4 and MD5
Preimage attacks on MD4 and MD5 are proposed by Aoki and Sasaki [1] . [2] , Aoki and Sasaki focused attention on the property that chaining variables in the first and last steps can be considered to be consecutive by the equation p 0 = H n − p last . This idea enables them to start the meet-in-the-middle attack from any step.
Aoki and Sasaki also proposes another technique named partial matching. This technique enables attackers to skip several steps when they search for good chunks in the attack target. Assume that one of divided chunks provides the value of p i , where 3 General strategies of our preimage attack 3.1 Strategy 1: speed up the brute-force attack This is a technique that enables us to quickly search for a message which connects a given initial value IV and a given hash value H n . The idea is to reuse an intermediate value of
Moreover, since IV and H n are fixed, the values of chaining variables in the last round can also be reused. Let steps at which m a and m b are used be s 3 , s 4 , (s 3 < s 4 ). In this case, the computation result from Step s 4 to the last can be reused.
Notice, this technique can also be achieved by inserting local collision in the last round.
Strategy 2: finding pseudo-preimages by the meet-in-the-middle attack
Combining the splice-and-cut and local-collision. The technique proposed by Aumasson et al. [2] is for finding a pseudo-preimage by applying the meet-inthe-middle attack that starts from the first step and the last step. On the other hand, the splice-and-cut and partial-matching techniques proposed by Aoki and Sasaki [1] are for finding a pseudo-preimage by applying the meet-in-the-middle attack that starts from an intermediate step. We found that these two techniques can be combined together, and more steps might be attacked. Aumasson et al. use the fact that m 6 is used near the first step, m 5 is used near the last step, and corresponding chaining variables appear in the same equation for the computing hash value. We found that their technique can be used at not only the first and last several steps but also intermediate steps.
Observation: The key idea of the attack is searching for message words that can form a local collision. In fact, their selection of message words can be considered as a local collision that starts with Step 94 and ends with Step 6.
The graphical explanation is shown in Fig. 3 Extension to use long collision paths. The local-collision technique described above can be extended to use a long collision path as shown in Fig. 4 .
In HAVAL, the influence of changing m π(i) can be offset by changing m π(i+8n) , n ≥ 1. In this case, m π(i+8k) , 1 ≤ k < n can be any message word. We call m π(i+8k) uninvolved messages. As long as the meet-in-the-middle attack with a local collision such as the attack approach of Aumasson et al. is taken, neutral words can also be used as uninvolved messages. On the other hand, in our approach explained in Section 5.3, we use "meet-in-the-middle attack" which uses two tables but does not get the gain of the time-to-memory conversion. Thus, neutral words require to increase the complexity of about n/(number of all steps), since we need to fix all variables within local collision steps before we perform the "meet-in-the-middle attack". We also note that the changes of a 32-bit chaining variable corresponding to neutral words must be absorbed in the Boolean functions so that other chaining variables are not changed. Achieving this tends to Number of rounds that can be attacked. The meet-in-the-middle attack works very efficiently if the message expansion consists of a permutation of message word order in each round like MD5 or HAVAL. In this section, we formalize how many rounds can be attacked. Attack strategies are also drawn in Fig. 5 .
We explain how to attack a hash function that has only one-round. Let us divide the attack target into the first half and the last half steps. In a round, each message appears only once. Therefore, any pair of message words used in the first and second chunks are independent each other, hence they can be used as the neutral words. Finally, we perform the meet-in-the-middle attack between the first chunk including m a and the second chunk including m b .
To attack a two-round hash function, we use the property that chaining variables in the first and last steps can be considered to be consecutive. Let a pair of message words (m a , m b ) appear in the first round in this order. In the second round, if m b is used in an earlier step than m a , the attack target can be divided into two chunks so that one chunk includes a neutral word m a and the other chunk includes m b . Therefore, a pseudo-preimage attack can be achieved by the splice-and-cut technique.
A three-round hash function can be attacked by combining the splice-and-cut technique and one of the partial-matching or local collision techniques. Assume (m a , m b ) is a pair of message words that can be skipped by using the partialmatching or local-collision technique. In Fig. 5 , skipped steps are indicated by parentheses. If the same strategy for the two-round attack can be applied in the rest of steps, a pseudo-preimage attack can be achieved.
To attack a four-round hash function, we need to use all techniques. At the beginning of two chunks, we skip several steps by the local-collision technique, Table 4 . Message word distribution for fast brute-force attack on 3-pass HAVAL
Step 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 and at the end of two chunks, we skip several steps by the partial-matching technique. Both skipped steps need to include both neutral words.
Preimage attacks on HAVAL following the strategy 1
We apply the general strategy 1 explained in Section 3 to all passes of HAVAL. The memory requirement of the attack is negligible. First, we consider a preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL. According to the message expansion of HAVAL shown in Table 2 , if we make a local collision from Steps 9 to 17, computation results for 77 steps out of 96 steps can be reused among different messages. The message word distribution for this attack is shown in Table 4 .
The attack procedure is as follows: ) and success probability of step 5 is 2 −224 (= 2 −256 ·2 32 ). Therefore, by repeating the procedure 2 224 times by changing the values of m i , 18 ≤ i ≤ 28, a message that connects a given IV and H n will be found at the complexity of 2 253 (= 2 29 · 2 224 ). On 4-pass HAVAL, the attack procedure is similar to 3-pass HAVAL. Applying local collision in the last round between Steps 102-110, the complexity 
Preimage attacks on HAVAL following the strategy 2
Our general strategy 1 can work for all passes of HAVAL, however, the efficiency is not so high. This section further reduces the complexity of preimage attacks by using the general strategy 2, which uses the meet-in-the-middle approach.
A preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL
We propose a preimage attack on 3-pass HAVAL, which finds a pseudo-preimage of 3-pass HAVAL at the complexity of 2 192 , and is converted to a preimage attack of the complexity of 2 225 . Thus, the resulting preimage is 2-block long. This attack uses the splice-and-cut and partial-matching techniques as shown in Table 5 .
The attack procedure for a hash value
is as follows. Step 4 requires 13 × 2 64 words of memory and other steps require negligible amount of memory.
A preimage attack on 4-pass HAVAL
We propose a preimage attack on 4-pass HAVAL, which finds a pseudo-preimage of 4-pass HAVAL at the complexity of 2 224 , and is converted to a preimage attack of the complexity of 2 241 . Thus, the resulting preimage is 2-block long. This attack uses the splice-and-cut, partial-matching, and local-collision techniques as shown in Table 6 .
In this attack, we need to guarantee that the neutral words form a localcollision in Steps 24-32. This is achieved by fixing chaining variables so that the change of a chaining variable corresponding to both neutral words does not propagate through the Boolean functions. How chaining variables are fixed is shown in Table 7 , where, 0, 1, C i , and * denote 0x00000000, 0xffffffff, a fixed value, and a flexible value which depends on the value of neutral words, respectively.
is as follows. 5.3 Notes on preimage attack on 5-pass HAVAL A preimage attack on 5-pass HAVAL reduced to 151 steps 5-pass HAVAL reduced to 151 steps, which use the first 151 steps of 5-pass HAVAL, can be attacked by using the almost same approach as the attack on 4-pass HAVAL. In Table 6 , Step 127 is a part of the second chunk that includes m 5 and is independent of m 24 . According to the message expansion shown in Table 2 , Steps 128-150 are independent from m 24 . Therefore, the attack on 4-pass HAVAL in the last section can also be applied to the first 151 steps of 5-pass HAVAL. The complexity is almost the same, so we can find a pseudopreimage at the complexity of 2 224 , and this attack is converted to a preimage attack of the complexity of 2 241 , and requires 10 × 2 64 words of memory. Note, we experimentally confirmed that there is no selection of chunks that can attack more than 151 steps at the better complexity. A preimage attack on full 5-pass HAVAL As mentioned in Section 3.2, our attack works efficiently on a hash function with less than or equal to 4 rounds, but does not work on the one with more than 4 rounds. However, by combining the exhaustive search, we can find a pseudo-preimage at 2 253.81 . To attack full 5-pass HAVAL, we need to use all the techniques explained: splice-and-cut, partial-matching, and local-collision techniques. The selection of the chunks are shown in Table 8 . We stress that our computer search program did not find a pair of chunks that can be attacked with a 9-step local collision. This problem was solved by using a long collision path introduced in Section 3.2.
To guarantee that the neutral words form a local-collision in Steps 107-131, we fix chaining variables as shown in Table 9. 1. Fix the value of chaining variables as shown in Table 9 , and derive the corresponding messages by using the step function. 2. Fix the value of message words that are not used inside the local collision steps. Note there is enough message space to find a pseudo-preimage. 
